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This paper presents a Downsian model of political competition in which parties
have incomplete but richer information than voters on policy effects. Each party
can observe a private signal of the policy effects, while voters cannot. In this set-
ting, voters infer the policy effects from the party platforms. In this political game
with private information, we show that there exist weak perfect Bayesian equilibria
(WPBEs) at which the parties play different strategies, and thus, announce differ-
ent platforms even when their signals coincide. This result is in contrast with the
conclusion of the Median Voter Theorem in the classical Downsian model. Our
equilibrium analysis suggests similarity between the set of WPBEs in this model
and the set of uniformly perfect equilibria of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) in the
model with completely informed parties which we studied in a previous paper
(Kikuchi, 2010).
1 Introduction
Elections often involve uncertainty about the effects of policy alternatives.
Which policy works the best depends not only on parties’ motivations and
voters’ preferences but also on unobservable external conditions. In such sit-
uations, parties can take advantage of expertise offered by private think tanks
or government ofﬁcials, whereas most voters only have publicly accessible in-
formation such as that provided by the mass media. In this paper, we present
a model of political competition in which parties have incomplete but richer
information than voters on policy effects.
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1Our earlier paper constructed a model of political competition in which two
ofﬁce-seeking parties (that is, “Downsian” parties1) have complete information
on policy effects, while voters are only endowed with a common prior distri-
bution (Kikuchi, 2010). In this setting, voters infer the policy effects from the
party platforms.
In this political game with asymmetric information, we showed that there
exist weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (WPBEs) at which the party platforms
diverge with positive probability. We reﬁned WPBEs, showing that there exist
uniformly perfect equilibria with policy divergence.2
On the one hand, these results are in contrast with the conclusion of the Me-
dian Voter Theorem in the classical Downsian model, which states that under
some natural assumptions, two ofﬁce-seeking parties will announce the same
platform. On the other hand, our results have some consistency with empirical
studies of two-party politics. For example, Fiorina (2006) and McCarty et al.
(2008) report that in recent decades, the positions of the Democratic and the
Republican parties in the United States have polarized rather than converged.
The present paper extends the previous model to the case where the parties
can only observe private signals of the policy effects, while voters only have
a common prior distribution. An interpretation of the model is that parties
have different sources of policy-relevant information which are unavailable to
voters. For example, the Democratic and the Republican parties in the United
States rely on different think tanks for policy research.
Even in this alternative setting, party platforms may transmit useful infor-
mation on the policy effects to voters. For example, suppose that the diplomatic
relations with a foreign country X is at issue. The number w of weapons of
mass destruction that X possesses affects voters’ preferences over policy alter-
natives. Each party I receives a private signal ˆ wI that serves as an estimate of
w. Suppose that each party I’s strategy is characterized by a cutpoint aI such
that it announces a hard-line policy against X if ˆ wI > aI, while it announces a
soft-line policy if ˆ wI < aI. Thus, if, say, a1 < a2 and parties 1 and 2 announce
hard-line and soft-line policies, respectively, then voters will think that w is
likely to be somewhere between a1 and a2.
In this political game with private information, we show that there exist
WPBEs at which the parties play different strategies, and thus, the parties an-
nounce different platforms even when their signals coincide. This result is in
marked contrast with the conclusion of the Median Voter Theorem.
1In this paper, the qualiﬁer “Downsian” indicates the assumption made by Downs (1957) that parties or
candidates are solely motivated to win ofﬁce.
2The concept of uniform perfectness is introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
2Our equilibrium analysis suggests similarity between the set of WPBEs in
this model and the set of uniformly perfect equilibria in the model with com-
pletely informed parties. We thus expect that the number of WPBEs is much
smaller in the present model than in the previous model. In Section 4, we pro-
vide an example for which this conjecture is true at least for a class of WPBEs
with simple strategies of the parties.
There are other papers that study political competition between privately
informed parties. Among them, Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003) present a model
closest to ours. The only difference between their and our settings is that they
assume a binary signal space, while we assume a continuous signal space. Yet,
an interesting difference exists between the equilibria of the two models. In
their model, the only pure-strategy equilibria that satisfy a condition called
“symmetric voting” are the completely pooling equilibria at which the two par-
ties choose the same ﬁxed policy irrespective of their signals. Hence, the par-
ties’ platforms always converge and, moreover, reveal no information on policy
effects to voters. By contrast, in our model, there exist pure-strategy equilibria
satisfying symmetric voting at which the parties choose different policies even
when they observe the same signal. Moreover, at the equilibria, one party’s
platform reveals some information on policy effects to voters.
Banks (1990) studies incomplete information about candidates’ “types,”
where the type of a candidate represents his ideal policy. Each candidate can
select any platform, while the policy that he actually implements if he wins the
election is ﬁxed at his type. In his model, there exist universally divine equi-
libria of Banks and Sobel (1990) at which the candidates play different pure
strategies if and only if the costs of lying (that is, announcing platforms dis-
tant from the candidates’ types) are sufﬁciently low. In our model, parties play
different strategies, although they are assumed to commit to their platforms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct the
model of political competition with privately informed parties. In Section 3,
we study WPBEs in this game. In Section 4, we provide an example for which




There are two political parties, 1 and 2, and a ﬁxed number of voters. A major-
ity voting determines one party as the winner. Before the election, the parties
3simultaneously announce their platform policies. The parties can choose either
policy L or policy R. The winning party implements its platform.
Each voter i’s preference between the two policies depends on his type ti ∈
[−1;1] = X and the state q ∈ X. We assume that there exists a unique median
type tm ∈ (−1;1). In each state q, voter i’s preference is represented by the
utility difference between policies L and R, which we denote by u(ti;q). In
state q, he prefers policy L if u(ti;q) > 0, and prefers policy R if u(ti;q) < 0.
The state is unobservable for the parties and voters. We denote by P the
priordistributionfunctionofthestateonintervalX. LetQ bearandomvariable
which describes the state.
Each party receives a private signal of the state before its platform choice.
Party 1 and party 2’s signals are values s and t, respectively, in interval X.
They cannot observe each other’s signal. Let S and T be random variables
that describe party 1’s signal and party 2’s signal, respectively. We assume
that given Q = q, the random variables S and T are distributed identically and
independently according to a distribution function Q(·|q) on X.
Voters observe the parties’ platforms before voting. This is equivalent to
that they observe the event L ∈ {/ 0;1;2;12} which represents the set of the par-
ties that announce policy L. Events can be classiﬁed according to whether the
parties’ platforms converge or diverge. Events / 0 and 12 are called convergence
events, while events 1 and 2 are called divergence events.
We assume the following:
Assumption 1. Function u(t;·) is continuous and decreasing for all type t.
Moreover, u(t;q) < 0 < u(t;q′) if and only if q′ <t < q.
Assumption 2. P has a density p with support X. Q(·|q) has a density q(·|q)
with support X for all state q.
Assumption 3. q has the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (SMLRP).
That is, s > s′; q > q′ implies q(s|q)q(s′|q′) > q(s′|q)q(s|q′).
Assumption 1 says that every voter’s type represents his utility threshold
of the state in the sense that he prefers policy L to policy R if and only if his
type exceeds the state. Assumption 2 says that the distribution functions P and
Q(·|q), q ∈ X, have densities with full support. Assumption 3 means roughly
that a higher signal indicates a higher state, and is stronger than the assumption
that if q′ < q, then Q(·|q) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Q(·|q′).
We denote by ¯ um the prior mean of the median voters’ utility:
¯ um = E(u(tm;Q)):
42.2 Strategies
Each party seeks to maximize the probability of being elected.
Party1’sstrategyisaBorelfunction f :X →[0;1]thatassignstoeachsignal
s the probability that it announces policy L given signal s. Party 2’s strategy is
a Borel function g : X → [0;1] that assigns to each signal t the probability that
it announces policy L given signal t.
In every event, each voter votes for a party if its platform gives him a higher
expected utility; if he is indifferent between the two parties’ platforms, he votes
for each party with probability 1/2. This implies that in every convergence
event, all voters vote randomly.
Each voter i’s strategy is a function hi : {1;2} → [0;1]. It assigns to each
divergence eventL the probability that in eventL, he votes for the partyL, that
is, the party with platform L. In this deﬁnition, we restrict the domain of hi to
divergence events, since we have ﬁxed voters’ local strategies in convergence
events. We denote by h = (hi) the strategy proﬁle of voters, and denote by
h(L) = (hi(L)) the proﬁle of voting probabilities in event L.
We focus on equilibrium strategies of the parties characterized by cutpoints.
Parties 1’s strategy f and party 2’s strategy g are said to have cutpoints if there
exist x;y ∈ X such that
f(s) =
{
1 if s < x
0 if s > x
; g(t) =
{
1 if t < y
0 if t > y
:
We call the strategy with cutpoint x and the strategy with cutpoint y simply
strategy x and strategy y, respectively.
3 Political equilibrium
In this section, we study the pure strategy weak perfect Bayesian equilibria in
which the parties play cutpoint strategies. We denote by x and y the respective
strategies of parties 1 and 2. If the strategy proﬁle (x;y;h) is a weak perfect
Bayesian equilibrium for some strategy proﬁle h of voters, then (x;y) is simply
called a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (WPBE).
Remark. The strategy pairs (−1;−1) and (1;1), that is, the strategy pairs in
which both parties always choose the same ﬁxed policy, are WPBEs.
To observe this, consider the strategy pair (−1;−1). Given this strategy
pair, the only reachable event is the convergence event / 0, that is, the event that
both parties choose policy R. In event / 0, both parties win with probability 1/2.
5Suppose that in every divergence event, all voters share a belief that the state is
so large that the median voters prefer policy R to policy L. Then, in any state,
no party cannot gain a majority by changing its platform to policy L. The same
argument applies for the strategy pair (1;1). 
We denote by p(h;L) the probability that in the divergence event L, policy
L defeats policy R, given a strategy proﬁle h of voters. If h is a proﬁle of
voters’ best responses to (x;y), then for every divergence event L reachable





1 if E(u(tm;Q)|x;y;L) > 0
1
2 if E(u(tm;Q)|x;y;L) = 0
0 if E(u(tm;Q)|x;y;L) < 0
; (1)
where E(·|x;y;L) denotes the expectation given the strategy pair (x;y) and
event L. In the second line of (1), we use the standard assumption that each
party wins with probability 1/2 if the election results in a tie.
By Assumptions 1-3, if E(u(tm;Q)|x;y;L) exists, it is continuously de-
creasing in x and y (See Milgrom, 2001).







Assumption 3 implies that F(t|·) is decreasing for all t.
We denote by P1(L|y;h;s) and P1(R|y;h;s) the respective winning prob-
abilities of party 1 when it announces policy L and when it announces policy
R, given its signal s, party 2’s strategy y, and a proﬁle h of voters’ strategies.






Party 2’s winning probabilities P2(L|x;h;t) and P2(R|x;h;t) are similarly de-
ﬁned.
Lemma 1 says that (x;y) is a WPBE if and only if the median voters are
indifferent between policies L and R in every divergence event reachable given
(x;y).
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold.
(i) (x;y) with x;y ∈ (−1;1) is a WPBE if and only if E(u(tm;Q)|x;y;L) = 0
for L = 1;2.
6(ii) (1;y) with y < 1 is a WPBE if and only if E(u(tm;Q)|x;y;1) = 0. (−1;y)
with y > −1 is a WPBE if and only if E(u(tm;Q)|x;y;2) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In both parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1, the sufﬁciency is easy to show. Sup-
pose that the median voters are indifferent between policies L and R in every
divergence event L reachable given (x;y). Let h be a proﬁle of voters’ best
responses to (x;y). Then, by (1), p(h;L) = 1=2 for every reachable divergence
event L. Suppose moreover that in every unreachable divergence event, voters
have the same belief on the state (and thus behave in the same manner) as in
a reachable divergence event. Then, p(h;L) = 1=2 for every unreachable di-
vergence event L. Therefore, no party can increase its winning probability by
deviation given any signal.3
We provide an intuition of the necessity only for part (ii). Consider a strat-
egy pair (1;y) with y ∈ (−1;1). The reachable events are events 1 and / 0. We
show that p(h;1) = 1=2 for any proﬁle h of voters’ best responses, which is
equivalent to that the median voters are indifferent between policies L and R in
event 1. Suppose that p(h;1) = 0. Then, party 2 should deviate to strategy 1
so that it wins irrespective of the state. Now, suppose that p(h;1) = 1. Then,
ex ante, party 2 wins with probability less than 1/2. Party 2 can increase the
winning probability by choosing strategy 1 so that the election results in a tie
in all states. Therefore, p(h;1) = 1=2 if (1;y) is a WPBE.
Proposition 1 says that under an additional distributional assumption, there
exists a WPBE (x;y) with x = y ∈ (−1;1), and such a WPBE is unique.
Assumption 4.
∫
X q(s|q)dP(q) > 0 for s = −1 and s = 1. Moreover,
E(u(tm;Q)|S = −1) > 0 > E(u(tm;Q)|S = 1).
Assumption 4 guarantees that there are a private signal indicating the me-
dian voters’ preference for policy L and a private signal indicating their prefer-
ence for policy R.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then, there exists a unique
z ∈ (−1;1) such that (x;y) = (z;z) is a WPBE.







3Thus, a strategy pair (x;y) satisfying the sufﬁcient condition in either part of Lemma 1 is a WPBE
which satisﬁes “symmetric voting” of Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003) with the proﬁle h of voters’ strategies
constructed above, where a WPBE (x;y;h) is said to satisfy symmetric voting if hi(1) = hi(2) for every voter
i.
7for L = 1;2, which is a single equation for z. Recall that E(u(tm;Q)|z;z;L)
is continuously decreasing in z. Note that both limz→−1E(u(tm;Q)|z;z;L)









= E(u(tm;Q)|S = −1):
Similarly, we have limz→1E(u(tm;Q)|z;z;L)=E(u(tm;Q)|S=1). Therefore,
by Assumption 4, there uniquely exists z ∈ (−1;1) satisfying (3).
Proposition 2 says that generically, there exists a WPBE at which one party
chooses a ﬁxed policy regardless of its private signal, while the other party
plays a strategy that is responsive to its signal. Moreover, such an equilibrium
is unique up to the labeling of parties.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 hold.
(i) Suppose ¯ um < 0. Then, there exists a unique y ∈(−1;1) such that (−1;y)
is a WPBE. There exists no WPBE of the form (1;y), y < 1.
(ii) Suppose ¯ um > 0. Then, there exists a unique y ∈ (−1;1) such that (1;y)
is a WPBE. There exists no WPBE of the form (−1;y), y > −1.







Since E(u(tm;Q)| −1;y;2) is continuously decreasing in y, the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 1 yields
lim
y→−1
E(u(tm;Q)| −1;y;2) = E(u(tm;Q)|S = −1) > 0;
where the last inequality is due to Assumption 4. Since E(u(tm;Q)| −1;1;2)=
¯ um < 0, there exists a unique y ∈ (−1;1) satisfying (4).
If y < 1, then E(u(tm;Q)|1;y;1) ≤ E(u(tm;Q)|1;−1;1) = ¯ um < 0. Thus,
there exists no WPBE of the form (1;y), y < 1.
The proof of part (ii) is similar.
In this section, we have shown that there exist ﬁve WPBEs which have one
ofthefollowingforms: (a)thepartieschoosethesameinteriorcutpoint; (b)one
8party chooses an interior cutpoint, while the other chooses a corner cutpoint;
(c) the parties choose the same corner cutpoint.
It is conceivable that the set of WPBEs with cutpoint strategies is ﬁnite,
since WPBEs (x;y) with interior cutpoints are solutions to two equations in
part (i) of Lemma 1 and the number of WPBEs with corner cutpoints (WPBEs
of type (b) or (c)) is ﬁnite. This conjecture implies a marked difference from
the model with completely informed parties, in which there exists a continuum
of WPBEs with cutpoint strategies (Kikuchi, 2010).
In Section 4, we provide an example in which the ﬁve WPBEs of types
(a)-(c) indeed constitute the set of WPBEs with cutpoint strategies.
4 An example
In this example, we assume that u is deﬁned by u(t;q) = t −q, and Q is uni-
formly distributed on interval X, that is, p(q) = 1=2 for all q ∈ X. We also
assume that givenQ =q, S and T are identically and independently distributed




2(1−q) if s ≤ 0;
1
2(1+q) if s > 0:
Then, Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. Function q satisﬁes the monotone
likelihood ratio property with weak inequalities, but it violates SMLRP (As-
sumption 3). Assumption 4 is satisﬁed if and only if tm ∈ (−1=3;1=3), since
E(Q |S = −1) = −1=3 and E(Q |S = 1) = 1=3.
The conditional expectations of the state in the divergence events 1 and 2
given (x;y) are as follows.
E(Q |x;y;1) =

    
    
y
1−2y if x;y ≤ 0;
x+y
1+2(x−y)−xy if y < 0 ≤ x;
x
1+2x if x;y > 0;
0 if x < 0 ≤ y;
E(Q |x;y;2) =

    
    
x
1−2x if x;y ≤ 0;
0 if y < 0 ≤ x;
y
1+2y if x;y > 0;
x+y
1+2(y−x)−xy if x < 0 ≤ y:




















Figure 1: WPBEs in the example
LetW denote the set of WPBEs (x;y) with x≥y in this example. By simple



































types (a)-(c) constitute the set of WPBEs with cutpoint strategiesif Assumption
4 holds and if um ̸= 0, that is, if tm ∈ (−1=3;0) or tm ∈ (0;1=3).4
Figure 1 illustrates the set of WPBEs with cutpoint strategies in this ex-
ample for the cases where tm = −0:2 (the left graph) and tm = 0:2 (the right
graph). WPBEs are represented by dots. The curves labeled “E1 = tm” and
“E2=tm”representthesetsof(x;y)satisfyingtheequationsE(u(tm;Q)|x;y;1)
= 0 and E(u(tm;Q)|x;y;2) = 0, respectively.
In this example, there exist signiﬁcantly fewer WPBEs with cupoint strate-
gies than in the model with completely informed parties. Moreover, the set of
WPBEs with cupoint strategies in this example has some similarity with the
set of uniformly perfect equilibria (in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988))
with cutpoint strategies (UPECs) in the model with completely informed par-
ties.
Figure 2 illustrates the sets of WPBEs and UPECs in the model with com-
pletely informed parties for the cases where tm = −0:2 (the left graph) and
tm = 0:2 (the right graph). Except for the complete information of the parties,
the same setting as the present example is assumed. The union of the two line
segments represents the set of WPBEs with cutpoint strategies. The three dots
represent the UPECs.
4Note that in this example, the sign of tm equals the sign of ¯ um = E(tm −Q).


















Figure 2: WPBEs and UPECs in the example when parties have complete information
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have constructed a Downsian model of political competition
in which parties can observe private signals of policy effects, while voters only
have a prior distribution. In this model, we have shown that there exist WPBEs
at which the parties play different strategies, and hence, choose different poli-
cies even when their signals coincide. This result is in marked contrast with the
Median Voter Theorem in the classical Downsian model.
We have derived equilibrium conditions which suggest that this model has
only a ﬁnite number of WPBEs with cutpoint strategies, whereas the model
with completely informed parties has a continuum of WPBEs (Kikuchi, 2010).
In an example, we have shown that there exist exactly ﬁve WPBEs with cut-
point strategies. Moreover, three of these equilibria locate at points close to
the three uniformly perfect equilibria with cutpoint strategies (UPECs) in the
model with completely informed parties.
An important next step in this research would be to reﬁne the WPBEs. For
this purpose, the trembling-hand perfection will again be useful. We expect
that the set of UPECs in the present model comprises the three WPBEs close
to the UPECs in the model with completely informed parties.
The model in this paper would also be instrumental in reﬁning WPBEs in
the model with completely informed parties. We may consider the limits of
WPBEs when the precisions of the signals go to inﬁnity as equilibria that are
stable against incomplete information of the parties. Our analysis indicates
that the set of the limit WPBEs with cutpoint strategies will resemble, but not
coincide with the set of UPECs.5 These remaining problems are open to future
research efforts.
5For example, if ¯ um < 0, then in the model with completely informed parties, the strategy pair (1;1) is
not a UPEC, whereas in the model with private information, it is a WPBE irrespective of the distribution
functions P and Q.
116 Appendix: proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Part (i). Let (x;y) be a strategy pair with x;y ∈ (−1;1). Let h be the
proﬁle of voters’ best responses to (x;y). Since both events 1 and 2 are reach-
able given (x;y), p(h;L) is determined by (1) for L = 1;2. Hence, our goal is
to show that the strategy pair (x;y) is a WPBE if and only if
p(h;L) = 1=2 for L = 1;2: (5)
We ﬁrst show that if the strategy pair (x;y) is a WPBE, then it satisﬁes (5).
By (2), policy L is optimal for party 1 given signal s′ < x if and only if
F(y|s′){p(h;2)−p(h;1)} ≥ 1
2 −p(h;1): (6)
Similarly, policy R is optimal for party 1 given signal s > x if and only if
F(y|s){p(h;2)−p(h;1)} ≤ 1
2 −p(h;1): (7)
By Assumption 3, F(y|s) < F(y|s′) for s′; s ∈ X with s′ < x < s. Thus, (6)
and (7) imply that
p(h;1) ≤ p(h;2): (8)
If (8) holds with equality, then by (6) and (7), p(h;1) = p(h;2) = 1=2. Thus, it
remains to show the inequality opposite to (8).
To do this, observe that party 2’s respective winning probabilities given





Policy L is optimal for party 2 given signal t′ < y if and only if
F(x|t′){p(h;1)−p(h;2)} ≥ 1
2 −p(h;2): (9)
Policy R is optimal for party 2 given signal t > y if and only if
F(x|t){p(h;1)−p(h;2)} ≤ 1
2 −p(h;2): (10)
The same argument as the preceding paragraph yields that (9) and (10) imply
p(h;1) ≥ p(h;2);
which is the desired inequality.
The converse is also true since (5) implies that conditions (6), (7), (9), and
(10) hold with equalities.
12Part (ii). Consider a strategy pair (1;y) with y < 1. Given this strategy pair,
the only reachable divergence event is event 1. Thus, we have to prove that the
strategy pair is a WPBE if and only if (5) holds for L = 1.
Suppose ﬁrst that y ∈ (−1;1). For (1;y) to be a WPBE, conditions (6),
(9), and (10) are necessary and sufﬁcient, where p(h;2) is interpreted as the
winning probability given some beliefs of voters. The last two conditions are
equivalent to (5) for L = 1 since Q(1|t′) = Q(1|t) = 1. Conversely, suppose
that(5) holds forL =1. Suppose, moreover, that h isa strategyproﬁle of voters
in which they vote optimally according to the common belief that in event L,
the median voters are indifferent between policies L and R. Then, (6) holds
with equality.
For the strategy pair (1;−1) to be a WPBE, (6) and (10) are necessary and
sufﬁcient. Since Q(−1|s′)=0 and Q(1|t)=1, these conditions are equivalent
to p(h;1) = 1=2. The proof for strategy pairs (−1;y), y > −1, is similar.
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